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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I aim to connect technology’s progression with the empirical validity of a
state and the disintegration of territoriality of a state. Technology and its progression has seen a
significant bolster of the past twenty years in its capacity to be used by states in order to
strengthen their domestic power. While, this has been ongoing, technology also redefines how
states may reach one another. Technology has given states the chance for repression of citizens
via acritical intelligence and other controlling factors, but it has also given states the technology
to hack intentional grids, commit online warfare and control international feelings towards a
country. As technology continues to progress, the new schematics of international relations is
ever changing. This research aims to study already existing case studies on technology and its
impact, while potentially giving guidance on how to predict future impacts on states and global
sovereignty.
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Modern technology and its impact on the modern nation state, its implications on the
international relations of the world is a realm of international relations that is every changing,
ever growing and every producing new issues to address, but it is necessary to start in facing
them head on. In this paper, the aim is to explore technology’s current impact on nation states. In
order to do so, the original nature of states, how that nature has changed over the course of time
due to technology deeply impacting the nature of states and their impact on the international
arena will be studied and discussed. This area of study is relativity new seeing as technology and
the internet as we know it is less than 20 years old, a mere blimp on the timeline of international
relations. It is continuously evolving in its nature and its implications in a nation state and the
world. In the modern era there seems to be no limitation on the evolution of technology due to
the role of development in such quick intervals and of such large effect. Due to the rapid
improvement of technology its progression and effects are hard to track in relation to the
imminent effect on states. However, this study aims to look at the course of the past 20 years of
shifting in states that have been brought on due to technology with various case studies of
autocratic and democratic states. Looking at case studies serves as the best way can to observe
how states and the international theatre will need to adapt and act in order to keep stability for
citizens and continue to act as a sovereign nation under technological advancements. These ways
are necessary to determine, because technology has brought and will continue to bring about an
onslaught of troubles in relation to the internal sovereignty of a nation and also global
sovereignty. Technology in the sense of this thesis is the variety of uses it can serve for a nation
state in the form of internal and external affairs. For instance, technology can be use in the form
of internet control, social media repression and a data limitation. For external matters,
technology can be used as a new form of warfare, with virus technology capable of slipping
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hackers and malware through sovereign borders without detection. This is uncharted territory for
many nation states on how to handle technology and to what advantages and disadvantages it can
bring to a state. However, this new dawn of technology does not bring the same amount of
advantages to all nation states in the same applicable way. For authoritarian states and
democracies, technology brings about different uses, which is in part to the foundational
differences of both types of governments. It is also different for the uses of the foundation pieces
of each government. Due to this new dawn of technology, I make the conclusion that in previous
and current authoritarian regimes technology is used as a repressive tool for the self-interest of
retaining juridical validity for the government structure, and is therefore, by its use for repressive
nature, is more likely to inforce the validity of a government without the necessary approval of
its citizens. Whereas in democracies, it presents a challenge in how to control technology use
from outside malevolent forces and how to protect against technology misuses under democratic
principles. In all, 21st century technological innovations and its impact on greatly reduces the
existential quality of territoriality of the modern nation while also providing the capability to
maintain a nation state’s empirical strength.
To begin explaining what has led states to be in their current form it is necessary to
understand that states were formed out of greed for monetary and juridical control by bandits that
later turned into quasi- government structures. Mancur Olsen, in “Dictatorship, Democracy,
Development” describes and outlines the path in which autocracies and democracies first began
to emerge and form their own sovereign states. Olsen’s argument is founded on the basis that
true sovereign states evolved from rampant crime being transfigured into localized crime by a
single bandit acknowledging the benefits of laying claim over specific territory rather than
continuing to stay a migratory bandit. As many bandits tried to lay claim on a specific piece of
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territory, they fought over the chance to rob the citizens of that land in an effort to gain as much
as they could. With numerous bandits trying to control a single piece of territory, it was a loselose situation for both the inhabitants and bandits. First, each bandit had the job of warding off
other bandits. This proved difficult in an effort not be killed while trying to gain as much profit
off of the people. Second, the inhabitants of the sought over land were losing stability and
control over the region and were losing money as well. In relation to the impact on the
inhabitants of the area Olsen says, “anarchic violence cannot be rational for a society: the victims
of violence and theft lose not only what is taken from them but also the incentive to produce any
goods that would be taken by others.”1 So the civilians residing in the area would lose more and
gain nothing from having to pay taxation to multitude of bandits and had no incentive to produce
goods. The effect of banditry not only has negative short term effects, but long term effects.
Bandits, from the uncertainty of the future have no order or control in the ruling capability,
would lose interest in the long term safety of the state and stop producing goods. In effect, from
human self- interest, bandits eventually began to kill off others in order to gain larger amounts of
territory for themselves. This was also motivated by the interest to gain complete empirical
control and larger sums of money. It was also in the interest of the people for a singular bandit to
do so because, “if a roving bandit rationally settles down and takes his theft in the form of
regular taxation and at the same time maintains a monopoly on theft in his domain, then those
from whom he exacts taxes will have an incentive to produce.” 2 So, in the interest of control and
income, bandits became rulers, self-titling themselves into controlling a territory, under the guise
of an autocracy. Olsen, dubs this the first blessing of the invisible hand, “the rational, self-

Mancur Olsen, Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, (American Political Science
Review, 1983), 567.
2 Mancur Olsen, Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, 568.
1
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interested leader of a band roving bandits is led, as through by an invisible hand, to settle down,
wear a crown, and replace anarchy with government”3 which sparked the interested in bandits to
stop migratory practices.
Olsen boils down this argument for the rational interest within a person as to the
foundation of what sparked setting boundaries of a territory and the creation of governments of
an area. This foundation is critical in acknowledging that from the very beginning of state
structures governments and their leaders were, and continue to be, self-motivated in earning for
themselves and keeping the validity of the government stable. He phrases it in a way that was
relevant to the era of bandits and primitive violence, “governments for groups larger than tribes
normally arises… because of self-interest among those who can organize the greatest capacity
for violence.”4 For bandits, empirical stability was the ability to raise an army. Bandit rationality
is the state origin of what would now be self-interest. It is just particular to the time and place
that states began to form. Olsen states that “bandit rationality induces the bandit leader to seize a
given domain, and to provide a peaceful order and other public goods for its inhabitants, thereby
obtaining more in tax theft than he could have obtained from migratory plunder.” 5 So therefore,
in roots in self-interests, bandits formed their own governments in their own territories to
foundationally beginning a nation, thus incentivizing civilians to produce (by producing a sense
of new safety) and then gaining more by taxing for profit. This is where, for my research
purposes, forming autocracies started to grow roots of self-interest at the cost of the citizens.
The most important takeaway from Olsen’s article, by roving bandits settling down and
acting in their own self-interest, they set the path for state formation and government evolution.

Mancur Olsen, Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, 568.
Olsen, 568.
5 Olsen 568.
3
4
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This is proven in the fact that “any individual who has autocratic control over a country will
provide public good to that country because he has an “encompassing interest” in it.” 6 So, it is
always in the best interest of the ruler to create public good, because it is in the best interest to
their civilians to be willing and invested to produce goods and continue to pay taxes. This cycle
allows for the continuation of a state to be stable and free of anarchy. If the people feel safe in
the state and well protected by their ruler, they are more likely to engage in the social contract. In
essence, citizens will become more willing to continue the tradeoff of autocratic rule when they
are consistently receiving protection and goods they otherwise would not get without a stable
ruler. In addition, an analysis of an autocratic state must take into account “the stationary
bandit’s incentive to provide public goods at the same time that he extracts the largest possible
net surplus for himself.”7 So, when the formation of a state occurs out of the self-interest of a
bandit to make permanent territory and tax specific citizens within that area, they create a state of
which it is centered around their self-interest of profiting off the civilians and the civilians
having trust in the ruler providing safety and public goods, a key foundation of an autocratic
state.
To look at how Olsen’s theory applies to real implications of statehood, looking at Robert
H. Jackson and Carl C. Rosberg article, Why Africa’s Weakest States Persist: The Empirical and
Judicial in Statehood, outlines an effort to explain as to why some of Africa’s states continue to
maintain statehood while ridden with weak leadership, ethnic divides, and other dividing factors
when they are like autocracies. Jackson and Rosberg present this question to try and grasp how
states with leadership that isn’t validated, conflicting ethnic groups, and other dividing factors

Olsen, 569.
7 Olsen, 569.
6
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can survive, yet other states, if ridden with the same issues, would cease to exist as states. To
look at case studies about the foundational stability of various states is important to discuss with
the implication of technology, because understanding the stability of a state with the variation of
technology can help point to hypothesize how empirical and/or juridical validity is an important
factor in how technology will impact a state.
To continue researching the impact of state variations, the definition of empirical and
juridical state hood should be defined in order to understand what factors are changing in the
wave of new technological progressions. Juridical statehood applies to the territory and
independence over that territory a statehood recognizes.8 Further, on the international scale,
“determinate and recognized frontiers are therefore a basic institution of the state system and an
essential legal attribute of any state.” 9 The article, asserts the claim that the juridical validation of
a state can only be valid if looked upon in the same way by the international community. So, in
order to be held up as a state, the government must lay claim and continue to uphold the
boundaries in which they set forth as their own. Applying this to Jackson and Rosberg’s
research, they present the definition and application of empirical, which they claim is the
government security provided to a state to enforce stability, law and such. To define empirical
statehood they quote Brownline’s two attributes of a state, “ “a permanent population [which] is
intended to be used in association with that of territory, and connotes a stable community,” and
an “effective government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs.””10 This would
assume that juridical and empirical attributes are both needed to define a state; a population to

Robert H. Jackon and Carl G. Rosberg, Africa’s Weakest States: The Empirical and Jurdical in
Statehood, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983)
9 Jackson, Rosberg, Africa’s Weakest States, 13.
10 Jackson, Rosberg, 5
8
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occupy a set territory and a centralized government to rule over those civilians. While this article
mainly looks at how African states have persisted whilst not necessarily meeting this definition
of the standards of a state, Jackson and Rosberg make a generalized claim that empirical
attributes for a state is, “a centralized government with the capacity to exercise control over a
state’s territory and the people resign in it.”11 This would conclude that empirical authority relies
on how effectively the government can retain power to exercise the control. By exercising
control that is generally conceived as the ability to make, implement and enforce all laws,
policies and regulations set forth by the government. 12 If a state loses their empirical validity to
control their defined state then they lose the ability to function in any capacity that would be
considered foundational to the effective running of a state.
In Jackson and Rosberg’s article they delve deeper in other works in order to provide an
all-encompassing look at the definition of empirical statehood. To achieve this they dive deeper,
“Michael Oakeshoot’s delves further into looking at empirical attributes to exercise control,
stating that “the modern state consists, among other things, of both an “office of authority” and
“an apparatus of power”.”13 These two factors are critical in recognizing not only what makes a
state, but what a state wants to keep and make more of in terms of prowess. In this definition, it
is seen in states, such as in Africa, that one state may possess legitimacy, but not have the power
to prove it, or have the opposite, a lot of imposing power, but not legitimacy to the area or their
civilians.14 This shows that in the international sphere a state may still operate with or without
both attributes of empirical statehood, but at the crux of the definition of empirical attributes is

Jackson, Rosberg, 6.
Jackson, Rosberg, 6.
13 Jackson, Rosberg, 6.
14 Jackson, Rosberg, 7.
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imposing at least one or both of those empirical foundations upon the inhabitants of the state. A
government to achieve this will try and keep power in the means of one or more of those
foundational factors.
The conclusion of empirical and juridical statehood is that both are necessary for a state
to thrive, but technology can redefine how empirical standing is held and how if any, juridical
reason can be upheld. It will also realign how juridical borders are seen as no longer an
imposition to neglecting the power of a states sovereign borders. However, Jackson and Rosberg
argue, “a political system may possess some or all of the empirical qualifications of statehood,
but without the judicial attributes of territory and independence is it not a state.” 15 This
constitutes that in order to be a state, fundamentally, the government must have a territory they
claim and their own. This territory serves as a physical space that actualizes the government to
which they can rule over and control the lives of a civilians. Again, this has roots in the notion of
bandits creating private territory in order to turn more profit in taxing their citizens. The real test
is whether a state can live up to this bar constitutes as a test of sorts to provide territorial
jurisdiction.16 If a state does not have a territory they control that means that they do not have an
official state. A state cannot operate with no land, it cannot hold. So while, a state may have
empirical control over their land, if they do not have land to hold on to, they are not an official
state. The real test of the coming age of technology will be if juridical borders are upheld, how
important empirical standing of a state will become.
Applying the stability of statehood to technology is a constantly evolving topic due to the
fact that technology in the modern-era is consistently expanding in its applicable capabilities for

Jackson, Rosberg, 13.
16 Jackson, Rosberg, 13.
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developing nations and even stable nations. Technology can be applied to many areas of a state,
such as military sector, private sector, and public sector, but for this research internet technology
and additional technological advancements useful to governments is important in understanding
and answering the core question of how states have been impacted in the 21st century with the
rise of technology. Private technology will be understood as the evolving internet access that
private civilians have within a nation, this technology can be accessible by phone, private
computer, public computers and more. The important distinction about this type of technology is
that the overarching value of it is that the average citizen has access to it, leading to ease of
sharing ideas across a variety of platforms to a multitude of audiences.
The case study that proves the argument that technology impacts countries in both the
judicial and empirical sense is the state failure of Africa in the late 20th century. The world saw a
majority of countries in Africa breakdown into nation-states after communist regimes evacuated
the area. They then had the unique opportunity to develop by themselves, on their own
conditions of government. At that point in the late 20th century, many of the world’s nations
were perfecting nuclear weapons while African states were trying to establish their legitimacy on
bases of empirical rule. To start off behind the race, left states with holes in their establishment
and the lack of ability to retain credibility in government. This left African states vulnerable to
new issues that already developed nations would not encounter at such extreme pressure.
Already lagging behind on development, technological advances soon brought about issues that a
developed nation would be largely immune to, but that a still- developing nation is not so
immune to. Technological advancements made available to the public in the form of radio,
internet and phones enabled more room for anti-establishment resent and further divided the
leftover divisive nature of African states.
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African states suddenly departing from communist regimes to their own state rule was
hard to transition, further negatively fueled by the already present juridical borders being
haphazardly drawn without consideration to the inhabitants of the newly drawn borders, an
instance where juridical validity had an impact on empirical validity. Whenever Africa was
divided up by European countries, those in power divided ethnic groups and drew “nation” lines
without consideration of the ethnic makeup of each new state. This caused the split of ethnic
groups and the forced cohabitation of ethnic groups that would normally not have interaction to
such level. This gave a foundation for distrust of government structures to make choices that
would be in the interest of every group or have the same positive impact on each individual
group. This served as a breeding ground for resentment between ethnic groups. With these preset
conditions in mind, it is easy to see why nation-states in Africa failed after becoming free of
communist rule, “the conditions that led to the breakdown of order in Africa include the
authoritarian nature of its states and their rulers’ penchant for predation.” 17 Once given the
opportunity to rule themselves, like bandit mentality as seen in early Europe, rulers began to take
control of an area where its citizens needed them. This mentality was purely selfish and almost
mob-like, it was a race to claim an area and create a government, but what was fundamentally
missing was the empirical weight behind the government structures that were being created.
Anyone can claim a piece of land is their own and what they rule, but it takes the trust of
government leadership to make a nation an empirically sound one as well. There is also the
argument that “ethnicity and violence are joint products of state failure”18, but I disagree on the
basis that ethnicity is used as a mechanism, or cover, for conflict that produces state failure.

Jackson, Rosberg, 7.
18 Jackson, Rosberg, 7.
17

Fahrmann
14
However, it can also be a product or consequence of state failure. Ethnicity is a versatile ideal
when talking about building a nation. Ethnicity is a part of every single person within a nation.
When a government holds good empirical standing, ethnic groups get along enough to keep the
state running at status quo. However, when a government does not hold good empirical standing,
ethnic groups can start to find divisive lines which start to wear away at the status quo of the
nation. So, state failure is both produced by the erosion of ethnic groups and causes the erosion
of ethnic groups, which can also be underlying factors in the stability of the government to be
able to withstand external changes, as such to technology.
As seen in Rwanda and the Arab Spring, technology now has the power to instigate or
further a conflict or war like never seen before. The Arab Spring is a more recent case study that
displays the progressive nature of state sovereignty and technological advancements. The Arab
Spring, on its foundation, was perpetuated by social media and communicative technology.
While it is a contentious issue whether social media was used for communicative purposes with
resistance groups or as a news source for the rest of the world, this was a large world event that
centered around social media and its newfound strength of influence over international and
global citizens. Technology’s role in inciting violence is especially evident in the Rwandan
Genocide. The Rwandan Genocide started its origins when two ethnic groups were pinned
against each other by Belgium’s divisive border drawing, which created a deep divide between
the two groups for years. Technology fueled the progression of the conflict with the creation of
the Hutu Power Radio. Radio technology seems trivial in today’s modern era of warfare and
technology, but in Rwanda it was the means by which the genocide was instructed to begin and
also served as a mechanism to put forth anti- Tutsi propaganda before the genocide. Technology
served as a critical cog for the Hutu’s to start what they were groomed to believe was their right
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to do. TV and camera crews were also able to communicate with the world the horrific reality of
the genocide by means of technology in the form of photos, videos and audio. It is hard to see
what the genocide would be without technology.
This divisive nature of technology can create opportunities for the emergence of new
conflict and new avenues for that conflict. Rosberg and Jackson explore this idea by presenting
the research of, “careful empirical researchers, such as Hegre (Hegre, Gates, et al. 2001; Hegre
2004), confirm that new democracies and intermediate regimes -- those lying somewhere
between stable authoritarian and consolidated democratic governments -- exhibited significantly
higher rates of civil war.”19 As the world starts to look at technology, it needs to look at how it
affects domestic structures. In the latter half of this research I will talk about how technology, if
used in a specific way, will only enhance the states capability to either enhance or achieve
empirical validity. However, technology may also open up the door for more divisive natures
within a society as well. This topic will be later touched upon in China and within other
developing nations, but Rwanda is a good case study to see that technology gave another
dissenting group the power and the avenue to come to fruition with their thoughts and actions.
For autocratic regimes, technology gives government the specific opportunity and chance the
squash, or potentially enhance (if in their interest), dissenting opinions.
This notion also works hand in hand and is seen with the disintegration of sovereign
borders and respect for another nation’s empirical statehood. Hypothetically, if a nation-state
respected a neighboring nation-state or any other nation-state, they would respect the borders set
forth by that nation-state. Yet, conflicts occur where nations invade other nations, and in the
present day, send military technology to invade a country instead of sending ground troops. This

19
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would not occur if the nations respected the empirical power of another state and its sovereign
borders. However, the disintegration of sovereignty today can be attributed to the influx of
technology that allows all diffractions of intrusion into a country and the rise of differing
opinions on a given nation’s government’s validity.
But technology today is not only in the interest of government structures, but citizens as
well as applicable by Mancur Olsen’s “Collective Action” which seeks to understand why
groups act in ways that they do in relation to working as a group and coming together for what
they perceive to be the group’s best interest. This quest to seek the rationality behind collective
action correlates to the question of how technology impacts state growth, because technology is
now redefining how collective action is shown throughout societies by civilians in their
interactions with the internet. Technology, especially to the likeness of social media, allows
people to have individual voices. Due to this, collective thoughts and actions, are made more
easily accessible to a mass population and due to evolution of technology. This continues to
make it possible for civilians to join together in more cohesive ways for a variety of issues.
Another side effect of technology and collective actions is that technology also gives rise for
more avenues of dissent against government actions, thoughts, etc. The new horizon of collective
action in response to progressing technology is especially evident in the Rwandan Genocide and
the Arab Spring.
Another effect of technology on citizens is that ultimately changes in information
technology evolvement lowers the cost of believing untrue things for citizens, causing more
opinions on the empirical validity of a state. Participatory politics is greatly affected by this since
it is based on the assumption that the facts given to them are empirically valid even if civilians
may have differing opinions. To have more nonfactual ideas and implications of them floating
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around and being potentially ingrained in society implies that participatory politics is
undermined due to the introduction of new ideals that further undermine the empirical validity of
facts given by the state. Social contractarianism implies the indispensability of a shared factual
metanarrative by extension it suggests that there are real costs to abdicating the facts that make
constructive debate and compromise possible. This shows that the new implications of the shared
factual metanarrative being dispelled by ideals that undermine the validity of the state can, and
will, have costly implications. Cost one is the fact that social sanctions state that most people are
ashamed by the rejection of fact and dismiss those who reject reality as unstable or amoral. Cost
two is that in a standard historic media demand for empirically untrue media is low so the cost of
producing media that satisfies small market is high. Consequently, there are few entrances in the
market for “alternative reality news”. By extension, there is a deontic cost associated with
average people believing things they know are unlikely true. Deontic in this sense are words that
may or may not establish societal rules and formalities. This fundamentally changes the way in
which the state is perceived and the factual narrative is continually questioned as technology
progresses and enables more nonfactual ideals to be projected and accepted. This directly
impacts how a citizen may view the state and how much faith they put in the social contract.
Rebecca MacKinnon in “Liberation Technology: China’s “Networked
Authoritarianism”” makes the point that new technology in authoritarian countries has the ability
to further legitimize the regime, allowing the same, if not more, control to be possessed by the
government. She states that “it is unwise to make the assumption that the Internet will lead to
rapid democratization in China or in other repressive regimes. There are difficult issues of
government policy and corporate responsibility that must be resolved in order to ensure that the
Internet and mobile technologies can fulfill their potential to support liberation and
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empowerment.”20 This is the basis of what issue technology brings about to nation states, the
power for the government to heavily restrict citizens and their ability to reach the outside world
or to allow the Internet to be a new found freedom. Technology opens up a door in which
governments may seek out repressive measures to silence citizens on the internet. “At the same
time, in the networked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of individual rights and
freedoms. Those whom the rulers see as threats are jailed; truly competitive, free and fair
elections are not held; and the courts and the legal system are tools of the ruling party.”21 During
this time of unprecedented technological advancements, citizens are feeling a certain sense of
false freedom. They see the Internet as an outlet, one they never have had before and one they
are excitedly using. However, “at the same time… the government has continued to monitor its
people and to censor and manipulate online conversation to such a degree that no one has been
able to organize a viable opposition movement.” 22 China in this case, is too large and too
powerful with their capability in repressing Internet technology that the false sense of freedom to
citizens is just that, a false sense of freedom. So while citizens may feel as if they have a new
found voice to address social and political issues, they are not a condition that would actually
effect any decisions and changes made in the government.
In all, civic life is ill- prepared for the negative externalities that developing technology
brings forth. Technology’s accessibility has brought upon a rapid onslaught of new ideas and
marketable faster ways to publish and access them which changes factual basis of which social
contracts are applied. Social contracts used to be a mutual agreement between governments and

Rebecca MacKinnon, "Liberation Technology: China's "Networked Authoritarianism"."
Journal of Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) 33.
21 MacKinnon, Liberation Technology: China’s “Networked Authoritarianism”, 33.
22 MacKinnon, 33.
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its citizens. Citizens accepted the fact that governments take in order to give, the take would be
taxes, effort, etc. in order to get protection and a stable country. However, this social contract lies
on the citizen believing in the agreement on the foundation of the empirical strength of a nation.
So, social contracts are therefore undermined as well with the evolution of technology due to the
foundation of belief being shaken with the spread of information, true or false. An effect is the
balkanization of facts.
Steven Feldstein in “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is
Reshaping Repression” states that Artificial Intelligence systems, products of rapid technology
development and the need for the state to stay in control over technology development, can and
are being used as repressive measures for regimes. This is relevant to this research due to the fact
that this impacts the way in which regimes stay in power and uphold their empirical status to
both their citizens and the global theatre. To start this analysis, he states that “AI systems are
showing their potential for abetting repressive regimes and upending resurgence of
authoritarianism.”23, which is a new dawn of the acceptance of the true impact of technological
progression. This is especially important to recognize and study because “autocracies have
achieved new levels of control and manipulation by applying advanced computing systems to the
vast quantities of unstructured data now available online …”24, a categorical explanation of the
base level implications of technological advances. Further, “these innovations are a gamechanger for authoritarian efforts to shape discourse and crush opposition voices”25, showing that
governments can and will use technology to crush opposition voices within the government. On

Steven Feldstein, "The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping
Repression" Journal of Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press 2019), 41.
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the flip side of the coin, they can also project voices who are in favor of the government and
positive news of government actions. This is extremely important in looking at how governments
are now continuing to enable their empirical status without much of a cost. Artificial Intelligence
repression is so swift due to the fact that “it requires considerably fewer human actors than
conventional repression, entails less physical harassment, and comes at a lower cost. Yet it may
well have a more wide-ranging and systematic impact.”26 This gives governments even more
incentive to use it as a tool to keep its powers. Whereas it used to be intrusive and expensive to
maintain favorability among the country, new technology is making it easier, quicker and less
expensive to make a more favorable position for the government. The new dawn of AI
technology has made it more accessible for governments to start to repress the citizenry into
believing well of the government, whether or not the government is working in the best interest
of the people.
From this it is deducible that technology evolvement not only impacts nations on the
federal level, but state government as well, because states have become their own artificial
intelligence, where their citizens need to be legible. States also see humans as a policy problem
that needs to be solved. This emergence of thought comes from the horizon of big data analytics,
as technology is monitoring those using it and its output is analyzed. This has brought about the
horizon of trying to control false news, but can also be misconstrued as the hindrance of the right
of citizens to technology and the internet. The largest example of a state controlling citizens is
North Korea, however this is also evident in places such as the United States who possess the
same technology to monitor citizens, but claim to be following democratic principles when doing
so. As technology progresses and gives citizens a better and more open platform to air opinions
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and grievances, those potentially dissenting opinions from citizens make them targets of the
government to control in order for the government to continue on their path of empirical
stability.
Before the dawn of technological innovations, countries started to rework the way in
which their actions supported their own self-interest of survival, and this change has only been
exacerbated by technological progression in the favor of the accessibility of governments to
manipulate technology to their advantage. Feldstein notes this shift stating that “even before the
onset of digital repression, the landscape of contemporary authoritarianism was shifting in
noteworthy ways.”27 AI continually gives governments a critical advantage in keeping the power
they may have felt was slipping away seeing as now “…autocratic leaders are embracing digital
tactics for monitoring, surveilling, and harassing civil society movements and for distorting
elections.”28 Now, ever before, the temptation to use technology for the benefit of the power
enhancing of the regime remains in front of the leaders. That temptation does not go unused. In
today’s autocratic regimes they see and use technology as the great new frontier of continuing to
maintain power and extend their prowess even further than before. Because of this, the onslaught
of challenges brought forth by new technology does not stop for autocracies, but can trickle
down into the democratic sphere as well.
Democracies at their very core are established on the idea that they are governments by
the people, whereas autocracies are governments established by the governing leaders, for the
governing leaders. The difference is indicative of the fact that normally democracies would have
no need to use technology to bolster their empirical status, seeing as the people generally support
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them as they were the ones to allow them into office. However, Feldstein notes that technology
will bring forth even concerns for democracies. Feldstein notes this concern with the question,
“will the temptation to take advantage of AI’s surveillance potential ultimately corrode
democratic safeguards?”29 He asserts that even most secure, advanced democracies are not
impenetrable from the effect of technology. In the United States specifically, “protecting
individual rights and placing checks on governmental authority, the potential for state overreach
remained vast.”30 In recent events, this can be seen in citizen’s asking the what if questions about
how other countries could interfere with matters of democracies. The questions also ask how
democratic governments can overstep in their use of technology for the betterment of its citizens,
but really oversteps onto their freedom. Regardless of the over looming threat over all countries,
“the danger is much greater for fragile democracies or countries with authoritarian tendencies.”31
rather than well-established democracies. This is due to the fact that if there are already markers
there for a regrade into authoritarian regimes “the repressive potential of AI may lead to even
steeper deterioration”32, technology just speeds up the process that has been going on for a while.
This is also likely due to AI proving “its repressive value for the autocracies now pioneering new
technologies, copycat behavior by other governments is likely to follow.” 33 In contrast to the
United States, in modern day China, “AI is an essential component of the broader system of
control that underpins Communist Party rule.” 34 So AI is the holy grail of technological tools for
China’s continued rule. However, in America, we are already running a democratic system, so
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“we are in the best position to consider how to regulate private companies and prevent abuses.”35
Most importantly, “AI technology is “dual-use”: it can be deployed for beneficial purposes as
well as exploited for military and repressive end”36, so it is significant to note this shows the
duplicity of technology in the modern day. Technology is only what the state making it turns out
to be. So if a repressive state like China is using it for repressive measures to stay in power, then
the regime will continue to be legitimized. However, if a place like Africa is using it may be to
foster legitimacy for the regime in order to gain more power. In a place like America, technology
is both dangerous and advantageous because it can protect against attacks from other countries,
but it can also twiddle away the way democratic principles.
Technology has also produced a new issue of creating peoples whose net worth exceeds
that of the government under which they are citizens, thus no longer creating a need for the
wealthy to empirically validate the government under which they had a social contract with.
Technology created this problem due to the race to produce cutting edge technology. With the
rapid growth of technology came the rapid net worth growth of those who produced it. This is a
large issue, because essentially, if a government is empirically strong due to their economic
power, a person with more could be their own form of government. As a whole, this lowers the
empirical value of traditional notions of government. It also gives rise to the new issue of
controlling private access and use of technology in the notion of how governments would use
technology. This can be a rising issue in technology companies beginning to take on the role of
development of technology for government and military use outside the sphere of what its
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intended purposes are. If a person can individually do this, this gives citizens another reason to
stop or lessen their empirical support of the government.
Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil and Jessica Ludwig in “The Cutting Edge of Sharp
Power” looks at the new dawn of technology and how this advent of technology can and will
start to redefine the notion of sovereignty and the power of states on an international scale never
seen before. This is relevant to my research, because as power is defined and strengthened under
technology use the power of states to have more influence abroad also grows. This is relevant to
the claim that states now have more means and ways in which to influence the meaning of
sovereignty and international relations. They state that “manipulation of information at its source
and a wider offensive by antidemocratic powers in the realm of ideas have challenged some
deeply held assumptions in democratic politics.”37 China is a foundational starting point for
looking at how exactly a state has grown in its own technological strength and exerted it abroad
in order to pursue more empirical strength both domestically and internationally. The article
states, “a more multidimensional view of the modern Chinese party-state is now gradually
coming into focus as analysts start taking into account China’s global impact on democracy,
rule-of-law norms, and human rights, including the freedom of expression.” 38 This approach
looks at how technology penetrates all sectors of nation states, enabling them to penetrate that
power of technology in a more global way. In China’s case, as stated before, China has used
technology to alter how its citizens receive news, participate in technology and what is said about
the government on the Internet. First establishing control domestically with technology is
important to a state, because in that way they can establish ultimate power at home. In regards to
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the ramifications of the international realm of technology crossing states and interfering of the
sovereignty, the data is still new, but the patterns of domestic use can be put forth as prediction
pieces for how technology will be used on an international scale. This is evident in the fact that,
“Although China today is heavily interconnected with the international system, it has not become
more transparent and accountable… CCP has striven to reshape the global landscape in a manner
that suits its preferences…”39 This means that as the first country that the world knows is capable
of producing lass masses of technological repression for its people China is not willing to come
forward with their practices, advances and more in an effect to keep control over their own
progress. This is directly in line with the ways in with authoritarian regimes wish to make and
keep their power. Technology divides the government and the nation in the matter of the freedom
of technology and accessibility to it, which is put behind a veil of smoke and mirrors of absolute
freedom to it and the monitoring of it. Nations, in their best interest are not forth coming with
how much they monitor people’s access and use of technology.
The important point of the article is establishing the way in which the world has come to
recognize technology as the new age of ways that states interact with one another both for
positive and negative. They start by marking that indeed, “the global authorization resurgence
did not emerge overnight… early 2000s, the autocrats were already rebuilding their capacity to
exert influence.”40 This an extreme theoretical based off the fact of what is capable of a regime if
their prowess for technology is extensive; “the authoritarian’s refined and expanded activities
threaten the integrity of institutions from media and entertainment companies to university to
professional sports enterprises—all of which are vulnerable to manipulation precisely because, in
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free societies, such institutions are open to the outside world.” 41 The fact that some regimes are
not forthcoming with what they have power to do puts the world and the sovereignty we know at
extreme risk for sudden resifting in the perception of international relations as “authoritarians are
investing massive resources to attain a leading position in global markets—and in the process
they are changing how people around the world perceive facts and engage with technology.” 42
However, it falls as no surprise that autocracies are only willing to keep the information for
themselves as “the aim of these autocracies is make information available in a selective way,
something that is both integral to censorship and a key attribute of sharp power.” 43 This
statements solidifies the point that states work in favor of keeping their empirical power.
In further relevance to my research, as states begin to harness more power in their
technological prowess, they also grow in their power to exert that power upon other states, which
will prove difficult if states are not willing to recognize the threat of this. The article starts
exploring this by imploring that “democracies must reckon with authorization who are working
to reshape the international environment”44, seeing as democracies will be the leader in the
response to authoritarian regimes exerting technology for malicious purpose since they are have
technology freedoms in place. However, the article also notes that some democracies may
struggle with this seeing as “all this is occurring while established democracies are distracted by
their own internal struggles”45, so if technological advances do not necessarily have a direct
worry to democracies they will not look at facing the worry in that immediate moment. This is
perfectly summed up in the statement, “the afterglow of the immediate post- Cold War period,
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democracies failed to foresee the dark side of technological interdependence—namely, that it
would enable modernizing authoritarians to reach across borders to censor and manipulate public
discourse, sharpen polarization, and undermine democracy.” 46 Seeing that in repairing the world
as democracies knew it, autocracies were left unchecked in their abilities to continue their
repressive measures. In conclusion, “cyber sovereignty, in which national borders partition the
internet and curtail or even halt the free flow of information, used to be dismissed as a dictator’s
pipe dream… a splintered internet that essentially hews to this vision, with access for citizens of
authoritarian regimes curtailed by censorship, surveillance, internet shutdown and the like.” 47
which show a new horizon in how the world will start to handle technology.
What is important in “The Cutting Edge of Sharp Power” is that it loops together the
relevancy of technology to all countries and how it impacts global sovereignty, regardless of the
regime system used by a country. Regarding to Democracies, the argument is made that
“democracies have been slow to realize that the diffusion of technology does not automatically
foster freer information flows and democratic practices; policies and norms must be deliberately
crafted with these outcomes in mind.”48 This has the implication that democracies need to be
more alert on the external impacts technology can have on their society. Not only that, but the
fact that technology can easily turn into a snowball effect of misguided use that can deteriorate
democratic principles and violate the trust of the social contract with citizens. Democracies will
also need to be more proactive in monitoring repressive technology use abroad noting that, “if
authoritarian standards become more widely embedded, the space for independent information
will continue to shrink, weakening the health of democracy where it already exists and hobbling
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prospects for democratic advances elsewhere.” 49 This would lead to the conclusion that if
autocracies go unchecked in their power of influential technology advancements, the cracks in
weak democracies and autocracies will become wider and the downfall into a stronger autocracy
will seem more likely. This can be prevented by an international discussion on the long term
ramifications of technology and making sure weaker countries have various safeguards in place
in order to assure they do not fall into becoming a complete authorization regime. Looking
toward the future of solving this, the authors plead that “open democratic societies have a key
strategic advantage that closed authoritarian systems lack—the creativity and initiative of
vibrant, pluralistic civil societies that can inform, support, and help to realize such a vision.” 50
This would mean that strong democracies will have to play a keep role in the years coming
forward in assuring there are safe guards talked about and put in place in order to ensure that
technology does not begin to control international relations.
As technology progresses, it may be necessary for the international community to form or
revise a new definition and application of the meaning of sovereignty in order to adapt to the
way technology is rapidly changing the way in which countries and citizens view a nation states’
sovereignty. As state’s have formed, whether it be a natural progression or one that was
forcefully formed, they are a held up by the international community. In keeping with the
international community and its safeguards, states have had the responsibility to respect and
support the rights and sovereignty of another states. So that leads to the total idea of international
statehood being “mutual rights and obligations… the right of a country to exist and not to have
its jurisdiction violated, and its duty not to violate the rights of others.” 51 In keeping with that
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definition, the notion of what a states responsibility to the international community is will state
the same, but the way in which that is shown is different than before. So, it is imperative that the
international community recognize the new advantages and difficulties technology brings with
respect to uphold a state’s sovereignty and address ways in which to usher in a new approach to
handle the changes. This is important if the sovereignty and integrity of a state is to be upheld
within the international community.
The ultimate goal of a nation state is to keep their juridical and empirical statehood alive
and technology is the biggest threat to that in the modern day with social media, military, etc.
Technology is the new front of war for states and to combat it there are new extraordinary and
divisive lengths that governments will go to keep the status quo. It all boils down to the bandit
theory, someone in charge, or in some nations, the government, will do whatever it takes to
consistently keep and uphold empirical statehood for their own personal interests and gains.
In conclusion, the ending of this research was not what I originally hypothesized. Coming
into this research, it seemed as though technology would negativity impact the territoriality
externality of state in every way. However, this research concludes that technology can both
enhance and deteriorate the quality of territoriality of state. Technology redefines sovereignty in
the notion that states can have more power and influence both in their state and in other states
without compromising traditional notions of sovereignty. When a nation deploys some sort of
traditional warfare, ground troops, drones, it is considered an act of war and treated as such. The
leader of the government also has to respond to citizens. This has the typical effect of
sovereignty. But technology, such as AI, surveillance and Internet forums, show that
infringement of sovereignty is far less untraceable and countries can now get away with little
consequence. Seeing as technology gives countries the ability to do such, but also the ability to
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cover their tracks technology is giving global sovereignty a new definition in itself, and no
countries are immune from the shaping power new technologies holds. It is showing that now
more than ever juridical boundaries do not matter, empirical status does matter, the greater the
technology the more that states are able to retain their sovereignty, both internally and externally.
I look forward to continuing this research as technology progresses and countries start to produce
more data on the impact on technology on their empirical status and its use globally.
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